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Abstract 
The EU’s policy on Justice and Home Affairs has as its objective the establishment of the 
Union as ‘an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the 
different legal systems and traditions of the Member States’. How does this essentially internal 
objective translate into international action? How does the Union respond, in an internal 
policy field, to external challenges? 
 
This paper will assess the ambitions and the reality of the external dimension of the EU’s 
policy of Justice and Home Affairs from two perspectives. The first is the close link between 
internal and external objectives and policies, and the implications for both EU competence and 
policy priorities. The second is the progressive constitutionalisation  of the JHA field, its 
transformation from inter-governmental cooperation into a policy domain subject to the 
political and judicial accountability of ordinary legislative procedures. 
 
The paper is structured around a case study of the negotiation, renegotiation and eventual 
conclusion of the EU-US Agreement on the transfer of financial messaging data for the 
purpose of combating terrorism (the ‘SWIFT’ Agreement), and in particular the interplay 
thereby revealed between 
(i) different regulatory approaches  to data protection in the context of international 
commercial transactions and the needs of private commercial undertakings;  
(ii) different (EU) institutional actors  in the context of international action against 
terrorism where the EU needs to be seen as an effective actor and partner of the 
US; and  
(iii) the needs of public security and the need to provide against the risk of breaches of 
individual rights of data protection and privacy through the misuse of security-
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The EU’s policy on Justice and Home Affairs has as its objective the establishment of the 
Union as ‘an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the 
different legal systems and traditions of the Member States’.1
 
  How does this essentially 
internal objective translate into international action? How does the Union respond, in an 
internal policy field, to external challenges?  
The Stockholm Programme for Justice and Home Affairs, adopted by the European Council 
in December 2009, emphasises the importance of its external dimension: it is, the Programme 
says, ‘essential to address the key challenges we face’ and is ‘crucial to the successful 
implementation of the objectives of this programme’.2  And indeed the area of freedom, 
security and justice has been one of the most active domains of EU external relations over the 
last decade.3 The EU has concluded agreements establishing arrangements with neighbouring 
states on border management4 and on asylum,5 and a number of agreements on readmission6
                                            
1 Article 67(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The term ‘Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice’ (AFSJ) corresponds to the name given to Title V of Part III of the TFEU. The term ‘Justice and Home 
Affairs’ is not found as such in the Treaties; however it is a more familiar and recognisable term and it also 
represents the Commission’s choice of labels for its two Directorates General in this policy field: Justice (which 
includes fundamental rights and citizenship and is currently headed by Commissioner Reding) and Home 
Affairs (which includes migration, security and in particular terrorism and organised crime, and civil protection/ 
emergencies, and which is currently headed by Commissioner Malmström). These two DGs replaced the single 
DG Justice, Freedom and Security (known as JLS from its French acronym) in 2010. 
 
2 The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting the citizens, adopted by the 
European Council 11-12 December 2009, Council doc. 17024/09. The Programme covers 2010-2014. See also 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘An area of freedom, 
security and justice serving the citizen’ COM (2009) 262, 10 June 2009. 
3 On the external dimension of the area of freedom security and justice generally, see G De Kerchove and A 
Weyembergh (eds), Securite et Justice: Enjeu de la Politique Exterieure de l’Union Europeenne, Brussels, editions 
ULB, 2003; J Monar, ‘The EU as an international actor in the domain of justice and home affairs’ (2004)9 
European Foreign Affairs Rev. 395; B Martenczuk and S Van Thiel (eds), Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges 
for EU External Relations, VUBPress 2008; S Wolff, N Wichmann and G Mournier (eds), (2009) 31 Journal of 
European Integration 'Special Issue: The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs? A Different Security 
Agenda for the EU'; M Cremona, J Monar and S Poli (eds), The External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Peter Lang-P.I.E, forthcoming 2011.  
4 For example, agreements with Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein on their participation in the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the EU Member 
States (Frontex).  
5 For example, the Agreement between the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and Liechtenstein 
concerning the criteria and mechanisms for establishing the State responsible for examining a request for asylum 
lodged in a Member State or in Switzerland. 
6 Agreements have been concluded inter alia with Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the 
Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, Ukraine, Sri Lanka, Macao and 
Hong Kong. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 6 of 30 
and visa facilitation.7 It has acceded to the Hague Conference on Private International Law8 
and signed the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.9 It has concluded the 
revised Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments  in civil and 
commercial matters, and a number of other conventions in the field of private international 
law. It has concluded bilateral agreements on mutual legal assistance and extradition with the 
USA,10 several multilateral Conventions on organised crime, trafficking and terrorism11 and a 
cooperation agreement with the International Criminal Court.12  Specific provisions on 
cooperation in justice and home affairs are now included in association and cooperation 
agreements.13
 
 Although some of these agreements are mixed (concluded by the Union and 
Member States together), very many of them are concluded by the EU acting alone. 
It is clear that international cooperation is an essential aspect of this policy field.14 The threats 
identified by the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) adopted in March 201015
                                            
7 See for example Council Decision 2007/827/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement between the EC and 
Moldova, OJ 2007 L 334/168. Similar agreements have been concluded with Ukraine, Russia, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
 (terrorism, serious 
and organised crime, cyber-crime, natural and man-made disasters) are not threats which 
respect the EU’s external borders and it is not surprising that the ISS argues that internal 
security increasingly depends to a large extent on external security, that the concept of 
internal security cannot exist without an external dimension. External and internal 
8  Council Decision 2006/719/EC on the accession of the Community to the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law OJ 2006 L 297/1. 
9 Council Decision 2009/397/EC on the signing on behalf of the European Community of the Convention on 
Choice of Court Agreements OJ L 133, 29.5.2009, p. 1. 
10 Council Decision 2003/516/EC concerning the signature of the Agreements between the EU and the USA on 
extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters OJ 2003 L/25. See further V Mitsilegas ‘The New EU-
US Co-operation on Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and the Exchange of Police Data’ (2003) 8 European 
Foreign Affairs Rev, 515. 
11 For example the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention), concluded 
for the EC by Decision 2004/579/EC of 29 April 2004 OJ 2004 L 261/69. 
12 Council Decision 2006/313/CFSP of 10 April 2006 concerning the conclusion of the Agreement  between the 
International Criminal Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance, OJ 2006 L 115/49. 
13 For example the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia; these contain provisions on justice and rule of law cooperation (including independence of judiciary and 
improving police), data protection, cooperation on visas, border management, asylum and migration, control of 
illegal immigration, readmission, and cooperation on money laundering, terrorism financing, illicit  drugs, 
counter-terrorism and on organised and serious crime including smuggling and trafficking in human beings, 
counterfeiting, corruption, smuggling and arms trafficking. 
14 Commission Communication ‘A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’  COM(2005)491 of 12 October 2005; Council Strategy for the External Dimension of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, adopted December 2005, Council Doc. 14366/3/05. 
15 Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: "Towards a European Security Model" adopted by the 
European Council 25-26 March 2010, see Council doc. 7120/10. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 7 of 30 
dimensions of security are inter-dependant and a ‘global security approach’ with third 
countries is advocated:  
 
The EU must not restrict itself just to cooperation between the law-enforcement 
agencies of Member States and other countries, especially EU neighbours. It is 
necessary to build relationships with other countries through a global approach to 
security, working closely with them and, when necessary, supporting their 
institutional, economic and social development. This system of working will mean 
establishing opportunities for dialogue through areas of mutual interest, concerns and 
the possibilities for cooperation that can be identified in each case. Cooperation and 
coordination with international organisations in the field of law enforcement, in 
particular with Interpol, should be enhanced.16
 
 
In its Conclusions on the Commission’s Action Plan for the ISS in February 2011, the Council 
summarized its view of the European Security Model:  
 
[T]he European Security Model, as defined by the Internal Security Strategy … should 
be based on a shared agenda for action, an appropriate balance between prevention 
and tackling the consequences of threats to security, the development of security 
policies based on common values and a renewed effort to establish closer links 
between the external and internal aspects of EU security and to promote initiatives 
designed to strengthen the capacity for action of third countries.17
 
 
These are the ambitions. What of the reality? Before we turn to the specific example that I 
should like to explore today, let me first briefly mention three characteristics of the external 
dimension of the EU’s area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ).18
 
 
The first is in fact an aspect of the link between the internal and the external just mentioned in 
the context of the security strategy. External competence as regards the area of freedom, 
security and justice is almost entirely an implied competence – meaning that there is no 
explicit Treaty reference to external action or international relations. There are now two 
explicit provisions, both in the chapter on borders, asylum and migration, which reflect pre-
existing practice based on implied powers.19
                                            
16 Internal Security Strategy, note 
  All other external action is implied and this 
means that a specific case needs to be made for the necessity for Union action; it is not 
15 above, p.16.  
17 Council conclusions on the Commission communication on the European Union internal security strategy in 
action, 21 February 2011, Council doc. 6699/11.  
18 See further M Cremona, ‘EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective’ in M Cremona, J 
Monar and S Poli (eds), note 3 above. 
19  Article 78(3) TFEU provides that the Union’s common asylum system may include partnership and 
cooperation with third countries for the purpose of managing asylum applications or temporary protection; and 
Article 79(3) TFEU provides an explicit legal basis for readmission agreements. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 8 of 30 
automatic. Implied competence is deeply connected to Treaty objectives.20
 
  It flows from 
measures adopted by the Union in order to achieve (internal) objectives: 
‘The competence of the Community to conclude international agreements may arise 
not only from an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow implicitly 
from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework 
of those provisions, by the Community institutions … [W]henever Community law 
created for those institutions powers within its internal system for the purpose of 
attaining a specific objective, the Community had authority to undertake international 
commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an 
express provision to that effect.’21
 
    
Where a Union objective can be derived from the Treaty, for the attainment of which internal 
powers have been granted, these may be complemented where necessary by external powers. 
Thus in this Justice and Home Affairs policy field we do not see independent external 
objectives: the external action must be necessary to achieve the internal objectives established 
by the Treaty. The inter-dependence of the internal and the external is not only a matter of 
pragmatic fact, therefore, but built into the legal nature of the policy. 
 
Second, this is a policy area where competence is shared between the Union and the Member 
States. Power is not per se exclusive to the Union, which operates alongside its Member States, 
although once the Union has acted, its competence may become exclusive  through pre-
emption.22  As a consequence of shared competence, if an international agreement is 
envisaged, it needs to be shown that neither internal EU action nor bilateral Member State 
action will fulfil the relevant objectives. And indeed in discussing the external dimension of 
the AFSJ, the institutions have emphasised the importance of what they call the ‘value added’ 




                                            
20 See further M Cremona, ‘Defining Competence In EU External Relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform 
Process’ in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.) Law and Practice of EU External Relations – Salient Features of 
a Changing Landscape, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
21 Opinion 1/2003 of 7 February 2006 on the Lugano Convention, [2006] ECR I-1145, para 114. Note that since 
the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on 1 December 2009, ‘Community’ should be read as ‘Union’. 
22 Article 2(2) TFEU. This was the case, for example, for the revised Lugano Convention: Opinion 1/03, note 21 
above. 
23 According to Article 5(3) TEU, ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its 
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States … but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed 
action, be better achieved at Union level.’ For a recent example of the emphasis on added value, see the JHA 
Council Conclusions of 24-25 February 2011 on the Commission’s Action Plan for the Internal Security Strategy, 
Council doc. 7012/11. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 9 of 30 
The third aspect of the Union’s competence in this field relates to its constitutional evolution. 
The Union’s first involvement in justice and home affairs issues was through the so-called 
third pillar, introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty of Amsterdam brought certain 
aspects, relating to migration and to civil justice, into the EC Treaty but criminal justice 
cooperation remained in the TEU. The Treaty of Lisbon has reunited the different dimensions 
of the policy under the Title on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and with one or two 
exceptions24  the normal institutional and legislative procedures apply to this Title. The 
transition from the former third pillar has some important implications, in particular relating 




With these three characteristics of the EU’s justice and home affairs policy in mind, let us turn 
to the particular example I have chosen to illustrate some of the difficulties the EU has in 
translating its ambition into reality.  We are going to examine the negotiation, renegotiation 
and eventual conclusion of the EU-US Agreement on the transfer of financial messaging data 
for the purpose of combating terrorism (the ‘SWIFT’ Agreement). This is one aspect of a 
wider issue: international (and in particular transatlantic) transfers of data for purposes of 
combating terrorism and organised crime, and the implications these pose for the protection 
of fundamental rights.27
 
 There are three chapters in this story which each shed light on a 
different dimension of EU policy-making.  
First, the need for external action by the EU arising from different regulatory approaches to 
data protection in the context of international commercial transactions and the needs  of 
private commercial undertakings: the value added principle at work (II).  
 
Second, the impact of the constitutional change introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon on the 
relations between different EU institutional actors, in the context of international action 
                                            
24 For example, the special legislative procedure applied to measures concerning family law by Article 81(3) 
TFEU, and the ‘emergency brake’ available in the case of proposals to establish minimum rules on criminal 
procedure and criminal offences by Articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU. 
25 See K Lenaerts, ‘The Contribution of the European Court of Justice to the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice’ (2010) 59  International and Comparative Law Quarterly 255. 
26 On constitutional change in the AFSJ, see J Monar, ‘Justice and Home Affairs in the EU Constitutional Treaty. 
What Added Value for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Rev, 
226.  
27 See generally P de Hert and B de Schutter, ‘International Transfers of Data in the Field of JHA: The Lessons of 
Europol, PNR and SWIFT’ in B Martenczuk and S Van Thiel (eds), Justice, Liberty, Security: New Challenges for 
EU External Relations, VUBPress 2008; V Papakonstantinou and P de Hert, ‘The PNR  Agreement and 
Transatlantic Anti-terrorism Cooperation: No Firm Human Rights Framework on Either Side of the Atlantic’ 
(2009) 46 Common Market Law Rev 885. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 10 of 30 
against terrorism where the EU needs to be seen as an effective actor and partner of the US 
(III).  
 
Third, the relationship between the needs of public security and the need to provide against 
the risk of breaches of individual rights of data protection and privacy through the misuse of 
security-based powers: a test for the European Security Model promoted by the Internal 
Security Strategy which declares its commitment to ‘mutually reinforcing’ justice, freedom 
and security policies which respect fundamental rights, international protection, the rule of 
law and privacy28
   
 (IV).  
                                            
28 Internal Security Strategy, note 15 above, p.9. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 11 of 30 
2. THE FIRST CHAPTER:  
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AND THE NEED FOR AN EU RESPONSE 
SWIFT is the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, a member-
owned cooperative. According to its own information, more than 9,000 banking 
organisations, securities institutions and corporate customers in 209 countries use SWIFT 
every day to exchange standardised financial messages. SWIFT is based in Belgium but has 
offices in 20 countries, including the USA. 
 
After 11 Sept 2001, the US instituted the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP). The 
TFTP is part of the US response to UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). Under the 
TFTP, the US Treasury Department issued subpoenas for financial information to (among 
others) SWIFT’s Operating Centre in the United States. The US Centre had servers which 
‘mirrored’ (contained the same information as) the EU-based SWIFT servers and thus the US 
Treasury Department was able to order SWIFT to supply it with information on financial 
transfers between EU subjects. 
 
In June 2006, US newspapers revealed the existence of the TFTP and there was much 
comment about privacy.  It was revealed that the SWIFT subpoenas covered European 
transactions and concerns were expressed in the European Parliament that EU data protection 
legislation (especially Directive 95/46/EC29) was not being complied with. Transfers to the US 
need to comply with EU Safe Harbour principles.30
 
 SWIFT itself was unhappy about the legal 
uncertainty of compliance with EU data protection laws, and their TFTP obligations, and with 
some reason: on 27 July 2006 the Belgian Data Protection Authority issued an opinion that 
SWIFT activities were in breach of Belgian Data Protection Law, which implements the EU 
Data Protection Directive.   
In November 2006 the ‘Article 29 Working Party’ (the European Commission’s independent 
advisory body on data protection and privacy) issued an opinion on the processing of 
personal data by SWIFT. Its view was that SWIFT was in breach of Community data 
protection law in transferring personal data to the US (i) without ensuring adequate 
protection and (ii) without giving individuals information about how their data might be 
used.  The European Parliament adopted two Resolutions on SWIFT in 2006 and 2007, 
                                            
29 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31. 
30 The Commission Decision on safe harbour privacy principles establishes these; transfers to US are compliant 
only if made to companies which agree to comply with the Safe Harbour principles: Commission Decision 
2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC on the adequacy of the protection provided by the 
safe harbour privacy principles OJ L 215, 25.8.2000, p. 7. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 12 of 30 
referring to the fact that ‘businesses with operations on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly 
find themselves caught between the conflicting legal requirements of the US and EC 
jurisdictions’, and calling for an agreement with the USA to resolve the existing legal 
uncertainty as to data protection guarantees.31
 
  
What was the response? Initially it was ‘soft’, in other words an attempt at reassurance over 
compliance with EU standards rather than a binding agreement. On 28 June 2007 the US 
Treasury sent the EU Council and Commission 8 pages of ‘Representations’ outlining the 
operation of the TFTP and how its demands from SWIFT and its handling of the data 
received meet European data protection concerns.32
‘As a sign of our commitment and partnership in combating global terrorism, an 
eminent European person will be appointed to confirm that the program is 
implemented consistent with these Representations for the purpose of verifying the 
protection of EU-originating personal data. In particular, the eminent person will 
monitor that processes for deletion of non-extracted data have been carried out. The 
eminent person will have appropriate experience and security clearances, and will be 
appointed for a renewable period of two years by the European Commission in 
consultation with the Treasury Department. The eminent person shall act in complete 
independence in the performance of his or her duties.’ 
 It stressed the importance of financial 
information in tracking terrorism. It said the data was used only in connection with specific 
information on terrorist activity (no data mining or general searches) and only in connection 
with terrorism (no other unlawful activity such as drug trafficking or tax evasion). 
Unextracted data was deleted after five years. It set out the legal basis for the TFTP in US law. 
The US also agreed to the appointment of an ‘eminent European person’ to assess the TFTP 
controls: 
 
In December 2008 the Belgian data protection Authority issued a report confirming that in 
dealing with the TFTP subpoenas SWIFT now complied with Belgian data protection law. In 
March 2008 Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière was appointed by the Commission as the ‘eminent 
European person’ and he made an initial report in January 2009: this was reported to the 
European Parliament Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee in February 
2009.33
 
 The report confirmed compliance by the TFTP with the US Representations. A second 
and final report was produced in early 2010. 
                                            
31 Resolution of 6 July 2006 on the interception of bank transfer data from the SWIFT system by the US secret 
services (OJ C 303 E, 13.12.2006, p. 843); Resolution of 14 February 2007 on SWIFT, the PNR agreement and the 
transatlantic dialogue on these issues (OJ C 287 E, 29.11.2007, p. 349). 
32 OJ 2007 C 166/18. For the Council’s response to this, see Council doc. 11291/2/07 REV 2 (Presse 157), 28 June 
2007. 
33 IP/09/264, 17 Feb 2009. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 13 of 30 
At this stage, then, it was a matter of ensuring that the transfers within the USA made under 
subpoena by SWIFT to the US Treasury Department complied with the Union’s Data 
Protection requirements, and in particular its Safe Harbour Principles. The results of the 
negotiations between the EU Commission and Council with the US Treasury were a series of 
undertakings on the US side, with some EU oversight of compliance. However this was not 
the end of the story. 
 
From 1 January 2010 SWIFT altered its systems so that all the data concerning intra-European 
transactions is now held in two European sites and is no longer mirrored in the USA (a 
change first announced in October 2007). This would mean that its EU-based data is no 
longer covered by US law (or the TFTP subpoenas) and transfers of the EU data to the TFTP 
would no longer take place. The EU Council and Commission were concerned both because 
they wanted to demonstrate cooperation with the US on counter-terrorism and because EU 
governments receive a substantial amount of information from the TFTP, based on analysis of 
European records: there is at present no TFTP equivalent in the EU so the EU relies on the US 
processing of the data. In order to ensure that data would continue to be transferred from the 
EU to the US, on 27 July 2009 the Council authorised the Presidency, assisted by the 
Commission, to open negotiations for an Agreement on Financial Messaging Data between 
the EU and the USA (the FMDA). The Agreement would allow the US Treasury Department 
to serve production orders on designated data providers, including SWIFT. Here then we see 
the value added principle at work. The action by SWIFT made a formal agreement between 
the EU and US necessary, an agreement which – it was envisaged – would both require the 
transfers from Europe and meet EU data protection concerns. 
   Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 14 of 30 
3. THE SECOND CHAPTER: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
The proposed agreement was controversial and its history became linked to the coming into 
force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the changes that brought to decision-making in Justice and 
Home Affairs. It will be remembered that in 2007, following legal action by the European 
Parliament, the EU-US agreement on the transfer of passenger name records (PNR) for law 
enforcement purposes had been renegotiated as a third pillar agreement.34  It was now 
proposed that the EU-US FMDA, as a law enforcement measure, would also be negotiated and 
concluded under the third pillar.35
 
 But this was mid-2009 and the Treaty of Lisbon – which 
would abolish the third pillar – was to come into force on 1 December. 
On 17 September 2009 the European Parliament passed a Resolution on the proposed 
FMDA.36 The Parliament commented on the fact that neither the negotiating directives nor 
the opinion of the Council’s Legal Service on choice of legal basis were publicly available since 
they were classified as ‘restricted’, as well as on the fact that the proposed agreement would be 
fully provisionally applicable upon signature. While reaffirming its support for the fight 
against terrorism, it also mentions ‘the need to strike the right balance between security 
measures and the protection of civil liberties and fundamental rights, while ensuring the 
utmost respect for privacy and data protection,’ and the risk that the data could be ‘misused 
for large-scale forms of economic and industrial espionage’. The Parliament asked why Article 
4 of the EU-US agreement on mutual legal assistance,37
-  that data are transferred and processed only for the purposes of fighting terrorism, as 
defined in the 2002 Framework Decision on combating terrorism,
 which provides for the transfer of 
specific financial data on request, could not be used instead of an agreement on SWIFT, which 
provided for bulk transfers of data. It set out a series of minimum conditions that the 
agreement should comply with, including: 
38
-  that the transfer requests are based on specific, targeted cases; 
  and that they 
relate to individuals or terrorist organizations recognised as such by the EU; 
                                            
34 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04 European Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-4721.  
35 In 2006, as we have seen, the issue was dealt with in the framework of the Data Protection Directive and the 
Commission’s Safe Harbour (Adequacy) Decision of 2000. This was possible, even in the light of the judgment in 
cases C-317 and 318/94, note 34 above, since at this time the data was transferred from the EU to the USA by 
SWIFT for purely commercial purposes; the law enforcement requisition of the data took place within the USA 
(c.f. also case C-301/06 Ireland v European Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-00593). However from 2010, 
when SWIFT no longer stored their EU data in the USA, the transfers to the US of EU data would be made solely 
for law enforcement purposes: hence the applicability of the Treaty provisions on police cooperation. 
36 P7_TA(2009)0016. 
37 See note 10 above. 
38 Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, OJ 2002 L 164/3. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 15 of 30 
-  that EU citizens and enterprises are granted defence rights, procedural guarantees and 
the rights of access to justice equivalent to those existing in the EU; 
-  a reciprocity mechanism, obliging the US authorities upon request to transfer relevant 
financial messaging data to the competent EU authorities; 
-  the inclusion of a sunset clause in the interim agreement; and the negotiation of a 
possible new agreement under the new EU legal framework that fully involves the 
European Parliament. 
 
On 30 November 2009 – the day before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon – the 
Council authorised the Presidency to sign an interim agreement between the European Union 
and the United States on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the EU 
to the US for purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP).39 Like the 2007 
PNR agreement, its legal basis was former Articles 24 and 38 TEU; it could therefore be signed 
by the Council alone without European Parliamentary consent.40
 
 The FMDA was to have been 
applied provisionally (that is, before its formal conclusion) from 1 February 2010. The 
Agreement had a maximum duration of 9 months and was to be replaced in due course by a 
longer term agreement.  
On 17 December 2009 the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council decision concluding 
the FMDA.41
 
 With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the legal bases changed and the 
new JHA legal bases specify the ordinary legislative procedure for the adoption of internal acts 
(the agreement being concluded under implied powers). As a result the consent of the 
European Parliament is required under Article 218 (6)(a)(v) TFEU.  
In early February 2010 the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) recommended the rejection of the agreement.42
                                            
39 Council Decision 2010/16/CFSP/JHA of 30 November 2009 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, 
of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer 
of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program OJ 2010 L 8/9. 
  The LIBE 
40 A particular feature of (then) Article 24 TEU, which formed the legal basis for the signature authorising 
signature of the FMDA, was that although the European Parliament was not involved, national parliaments 
might well be: under paragraph 5, ‘No agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the 
Council states that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure; the other 
members of the Council may agree that the agreement shall nevertheless apply provisionally.’ 
41 Com (2009) 703. The legal bases proposed by the Commission were Articles 82(1)(d) and 87(2)(a) TFEU. 
42 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Recommendation on the proposal for a Council 
decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (05305/1/2010REV – C7-0004/2010 – 2009/0190(NLE)), 
Rapporteur: Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, 5 February 2010, A7-0013/2010. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 16 of 30 
Committee report was in favour of an agreement in principle, finding that the ‘soft’ 
guarantees in the US ‘Representations’ were not good enough. It was however unhappy that 
the agreement had effectively crystallized as a permanent arrangement something that was 
originally introduced as an emergency measure in the aftermath of 11 September 2001. It 
argued that the TFTP ‘must be considered as a departure from European law and practice in 
how law enforcement agencies would acquire individuals' financial records for law 
enforcement activities, namely individual court-approved warrants or subpoenas to examine 
specific transactions instead of relying on broad administrative subpoenas for millions of 
records.’ The debate was about ‘the law enforcement use of data collected for commercial 
purposes’ and ‘accepting the proposed FMDA (as it stands) could lead down the slippery slope 
of accepting other requests for commercial data with (f.e.) Skype, PayPal and other companies 
in the information-telecommunication field being potentially interesting for law enforcement 
purposes.’ The Committee was concerned about mass transfers of data, about the absence of 
judicial authorisation, about the absence of controls over further transfer by the US to third 
countries, about the lack of information on the period for which extracted information was to 
be kept, the gaps in protection (access and redress) for European individuals and companies 
in the US, and the absence of true reciprocity (no EU access to US data). The Committee also 
complained of the failure to give the Parliament full information, including the Council’s legal 
opinion and the reports by Judge Bruguière; it argued that this was a breach of the duty of 
sincere cooperation between EU institutions. It recommended that the Commission should 
propose a negotiating mandate for new agreements with the US on both financial messaging 
data for counter-terrorism investigations and privacy/personal data protection in the context 
of the exchange of information for law enforcement purposes (such as PNR). 
 
The European Parliament was especially angry about the lack of consultation on the FMDA. 
Home Affairs Commissioner Malmström spoke in the Parliament, arguing that ‘rejection of 
the Interim Agreement by this House would represent a serious blow to EU security’, but this 
was not enough. In an unusual move, the Council issued a Declaration the day before the 
European Parliament vote, pointing out that the interim agreement was to last only 9 months, 
that it contained many of the features called for in the Parliament’s Resolution of 17 
September 2009, that a longer-term agreement would be negotiated and requesting the 
Commission to adopt that very month a draft mandate for a new agreement, that the 
European Parliament would play a full part in those negotiations, that it recognised the need 
for the European Parliament to have access to restricted information and committing itself to 
negotiating an inter-institutional agreement on this issue.43
 
 
                                            
43  Council doc. 6265/10 (Presse 23), 9 February 2010. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 17 of 30 
Despite all these assurances, in a plenary vote in the European Parliament on 10 February 
2010 the agreement was indeed rejected. The negative vote by the Parliament meant that the 
provisional application of the agreement was no longer possible. A letter from the Council 
Presidency was sent on 22 February to the US Secretary of State, stating that following the 
European Parliament vote the EU could not become a party to the Interim Agreement and 
terminating the provisional application of the Agreement.  
 
The Council and Commission, faced with what they thought was an urgent need to get the 
agreement approved and the awkward transition to the new Lisbon Treaty procedures, had 
adopted the risky strategy of trying to ‘bounce’ the European Parliament into approving the 
agreement by presenting it as a fait accompli, an agreement already signed and about to start 
being provisionally applied, and which therefore could not be renegotiated. They judged that 
–  given a choice between accepting this and rejection, with  all that implied in terms of 
transatlantic embarrassment and security risk – the European Parliament would reluctantly, 
and probably with much verbal protesting, nevertheless agree.  The strategy failed and as a 
result the legislative initiative failed too. Instead of an imperfect agreement there was no 
agreement. 
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4. THE THIRD CHAPTER: SECURITY RISKS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
The rejection by the European Parliament provoked a storm of reaction, not least from the 
US.44
‘This matter is very urgent. We know that there is a clear security gap since January of 
this year because TFTP data stored in Europe are no longer made available to the US 
Treasury Department, so the aim is to arrive at a signed agreement as soon as possible, 
preferably before the end of June.’ 
 Before the vote Adam Szubin, the US Treasury Department official in charge of the 
TFTP, said that the failure of the agreement would be ‘very damaging,’ stressing the amount 
of information given by the TFTP to EU governments, including Germany. US National 
Security Advisor James Jones said that EU-US data transfer had ‘prevented terrorist attacks 
and saved lives’. Commissioner Malmström had argued in February that ‘refusal of consent 
risks to lead to both a data protection gap and a security gap.’ In April she said: 
In fact the gap was limited, since in the absence of the agreement, specific (not bulk) transfers 
could be requested under the EU-US Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance, together with 
the bilateral US-Member State agreements which the EU agreement supplements, and under 
the terms of national data protection law.45
 
 
The Commission and Council moved quickly to negotiate a new agreement and this time they 
made sure to consult the European Parliament at every turn. A draft mandate was agreed by 
the Commission on 24 March 2010 and agreed by Council on 11 May. The legal bases were to 
be Articles 87(2)(a) and 88(2) TFEU (police cooperation). The Commission made a point of 
stressing how much useful information was passed by the US to EU governments, citing 
specific examples. On 5 May 2010 the European Parliament adopted a Resolution on the 
Commission’s draft negotiating mandate.46
                                            
44  For a balanced and prescient assessment of the position after the February 2010 vote in the European 
Parliament, see J Monar, ‘The Rejection of the EU-US SWIFT Interim Agreement by the European Parliament: A 
Historic Vote and Its Implications’ (2010) 15 European Foreign Affairs Rev 143. 
 The European Parliament ‘Welcome[d] the new 
spirit of cooperation demonstrated by the Commission and the Council and their willingness 
to engage with Parliament, taking into account their Treaty obligation to keep Parliament 
immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedure’. The Parliament stressed the 
issue of bulk data transfers; these, it said, ‘mark a departure from the principles underpinning 
EU legislation and practice’ and this departure could not simply be rectified by ex post 
controls and monitoring. It recommended a system based on public judicial oversight based 
45 See Monar, note 44 above, at p.149. 
46 European Parliament resolution of 5 May 2010 on the Recommendation from the Commission to the Council 
to authorise the opening of negotiations for an agreement between the European Union and the United States of 
America to make available to the United States Treasury Department financial messaging data to prevent and 
combat terrorism and terrorist financing P7_TA-PROV(2010)0143. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 19 of 30 
in the EU and an EU-based monitoring authority. However it also opened up the way for a 
compromise, suggesting a twin-track approach, based on an FMDA based on strict standards, 
and ‘the fundamental longer-term policy decisions that the EU must address’. As far as the 
latter are concerned, the European Parliament argued that the best guarantee would be to 
carry out the extraction of data within the EU (i.e. to institute an EU TFTP); in the interim it 
proposed that the Commission and the Council should explore ‘ways to ensure, in the 
meantime, that EU select personnel – from EU organs or bodies, including for example, the 
EDPS [European Data Protection Supervisor], or joint EU-US investigation teams – with high 
clearance, joins SWIFT officials in the oversight of the extraction process in the US.’ 
 
There was a US charm offensive: MEPs were invited to Washington, and US Vice-President 
Joseph Biden made a speech on the SWIFT agreement to the European Parliament on 6 May.  
 
What were the key concessions, or changes, between the rejected 2009 agreement and the 
2010 agreement? 
-  A clearer agreed definition of terrorism, based on the EU’s 2002 Framework 
Decision.47
-  Verification by Europol, before the data is handed over of whether the request meets 
the conditions in the Agreement. 
 
-  Appointment by the EU of an ‘independent person’ to monitor the use of data in the 
USA; this is intended to prevent misuse of data –  data mining and industrial 
espionage. 
-  More detail on judicial redress for EU citizens as well as better regulation of rights to 
rectification and erasure of data. 
-  Regulation of onward transfer of data to third countries. 
 
The agreement is without doubt an attempt to balance security/law enforcement objectives 
with data protection. Within the EU, data protection rights for individuals have a higher 
visibility since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Not only has Article 8 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights on the protection of personal data acquired binding force; 
Article 16 TFEU reiterates the right to protection of personal data and establishes a 
competence to enact legislation on the processing of personal data by EU institutions and 
agencies, by the Member States when acting within the scope of Union law, and rules relating 
to the free movement of such data. Nevertheless, as the Opinion on the revised FMDA by the 
European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) points out, Article 16 TFEU was not included as 
a legal basis for the decision concluding it, although to have done so would have served to 
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emphasise that the agreement is designed to protect personal data as well as to facilitate its 
exchange.  48
-  The EDPS was not convinced that a case had been made that the transfer of data is 
necessary – as opposed to useful – given existing frameworks for exchanges of data 
based on the mutual legal assistance agreement and arrangements between the US 
authorities and Europol and Eurojust. He was not convinced, he said, of the ‘real 
added value’ of this agreement. 
 Although the EDPS recognised improvements in the new agreement, he also 
pointed to a number of remaining concerns: 
-  The EDPS was concerned that the bulk transfer of data does not meet the requirement 
of proportionality. The fact that the SWIFT system does not technically allow targeted 
searches does not per se render bulk transfers lawful.  
-  The EDPS argued that the maximum retention period of 5 years for non-extracted 
data (ie data that had not been used for any investigation) is too long. 
-  The negotiating mandate for the agreement had envisaged that a judicial public 
authority should have responsibility for receiving requests from the US Treasury and 
assessing compliance with the conditions for transfer. The agreement gives this task to 
Europol, which, as the EDPS points out, is not a ‘judicial public authority’. Worse, the 
agreement also allows Europol to itself request information from the US: ‘It is hard to 
reconcile this power of Europol, which may be important for the fulfilment of 
Europol's task and which requires good relations with the US Treasury, with the task 
of Europol to ensure independent oversight’.49
-  With respect to the enforceability of data subjects’ rights, the EDPS also had concerns, 
as a result of Article 20(1) of the agreement which provides that ‘This Agreement shall 
not create or confer any right or benefit on any person or entity, private or public.’ 
Given that current US privacy laws only create rights for US citizens and permanent 
residents, the position of EU citizens is unclear.  
  
-  The EDPS argued for the inclusion of a sunset clause as an incentive to finding a 
solution which would no longer require the transfer of bulk data. 
 
The new agreement was signed on 28 June 2010. The LIBE Committee issued a Report on the 
new agreement on 5 July 2010, recommending consent.50
                                            
48 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Council Decision on the conclusion 
of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer 
of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for purposes of the Terrorist Finance 
Tracking Program (TFTP II) OJ C 355, 29.12.2010, p. 10. 
 A minority were opposed on the 
49 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor, note 48 above, para 25. 
50 Recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Agreement between the European 
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ground that some key demands, especially relating to bulk data transfer, had not been met. 
The European Parliament approved the revised agreement on 8 July 2010 and it came into 
force on 1 August 2010.51
 
 
Unusually, the Council Decision concluding the agreement makes a binding commitment 
towards developing the EU’s own equivalent to the TFTP, thus removing the need for bulk 
transfers of data, since the EU would be able to respond to specific requests – as the US 
authority now does to EU requests. However until this happens bulk transfers will still take 
place. Of course, different views may be taken as to whether the agreement really offers ‘added 
value’ and whether the balance between necessity and data protection is the best achievable at 
present. The European Parliament’s change of view no doubt reflected both the improvements 
it identified in the new agreement, and the fact that it had this time been kept informed and 
involved in the negotiations throughout. It might also be argued that a Parliament with real 
joint legislative power acts differently from a Parliament with only the power of expressing its 
opinion.  
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5.  THE FUTURE: INTERNAL SECURITY WITH A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE? 
The Commission’s Action Plan for the Stockholm Programme foresees the adoption in 2010 
of a recommendation to authorise the opening of negotiations with the US for both an 
agreement on data protection for law enforcement purposes and a long-term TFTP 
agreement, and in 2011 of a Communication on the feasibility of a European Terrorist 
Finance Tracking Programme.52  A recent Communication from the Commission on 
establishing a new legislative framework for data protection53 emphasises the limitations of 
the existing regulation of data protection in the area of police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters,54
[T]he current legal instruments include no detailed, harmonised requirements as to 
which transfers can be considered lawful. This leads to practices which vary from 
Member State to Member State. … Moreover, international agreements concluded by 
the EU or its Member States often require the inclusion of data protection principles 
and specific provisions. This may result in varying texts with inconsistent provisions 
and rights, and thus open to divergent interpretations.
 and the need to review procedures and guarantees when data is transferred 




The 2008 Framework Decision on data protection in the framework of police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, for example, leaves to the Member States the assessment of 
adequacy of data protection safeguards in relation to third countries to which data may be 
transferred.56
 
 In addition, Article 26 provides that  
This Framework Decision is without prejudice to any obligations and commitments 
incumbent upon Member States or upon the Union by virtue of bilateral and/or 
multilateral agreements with third States existing at the time of adoption of this 
Framework Decision. 
 
                                            
52 The Stockholm Programme, note 2  above; Commission Communication, ‘Delivering an area of freedom, 
security and justice: Action plan implementing the Stockholm Programme’ COM (2010) 171. 
53  Commission Communication, ‘A comprehensive approach on personal data protection in the European 
Union’ 4 Nov. 2010, COM (2010) 609; see also JHA Council Conclusions on the Communication, 25 February 
2011, Council doc. 5980/4/11 REV 4. 
54 The current instruments are Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 60), 
together with Council Decision 2008/615/JHA (‘Prüm Decision’)  on the stepping up of cross-border 
cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime OJ 2008 L 210, p.1; and the Convention 
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the EU, OJ 2000 C 197, p.1. On the 
fragmentation of EU regulation of data protection in relation to JHA matters, and the resulting lack of coherence 
and clarity in the system, see de Hert and de Schutter, note 27 above, at p.314. 
55 COM (2010) 609, note 53 above, p.15. 
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As a result transfers made under the SWIFT agreement are subject to the safeguards 
contained in that agreement, not those in the Framework Decision.57
 
 
As we have seen, among the ‘significant common threats’ identified by the Internal Security 
Strategy approved by JHA Council in February 2010 are terrorism and serious and organised 
crime.58
 
 The European Security Model presented in this document emphasises the importance 
of integrating respect for fundamental rights, the rule of law and privacy into the EU’s justice, 
freedom and security policies, and ensuring an ‘effective democratic and judicial supervision’ 
of security activities by the European Parliament, national parliaments and the European 
Court of Justice. The Commission’s Action Plan for the implementation of the Internal 
Security Strategy, published on 22 November 2010, also emphasises the commitment to the 
protection of human rights – and indeed connects this to the inter-dependence of internal and 
external aspects of security: 
Internal security cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the world, and it is 
therefore important to ensure coherence and complementarity between the internal 
and external aspects of EU security. The values and priorities in the Internal Security 
Strategy, including our commitment to promoting human rights, democracy, peace 
and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond, are an integral component of the 
approach laid down in the European Security Strategy. As that Strategy recognises, 
relationships with our partners, in particular the United States, are of fundamental 
importance in the fight against serious and organized crime and terrorism.59
 
 
One of the actions specified under the counter-terrorism head of this Action Plan is the 
development of an EU-TFTP: the Commission undertakes to develop a policy for the EU to 
extract and analyse financial messaging data held on its own territory.  
 
In December 2010 the Council adopted a mandate for the negotiation of an agreement 
between the EU and the US on personal data protection when cooperating to fight terrorism 
or crime.60 This would provide the data protection regulatory context, including a supervisory 
mechanism, for specific agreements on data transfer, such as the SWIFT agreement, or a new 
PNR agreement.61
                                            
57 See V Mitsilegas, EU Criminal Law, Hart Publishing 2009, at p.274. 
  
58  Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model, Council doc. 
5842/2/2010.  
59 Commission Communication, ‘The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure 
Europe’, Com (2010) 673, p.3 (a footnote in the original text has been omitted). 
60 JHA Council Conclusions, 2-3 December 2010, Council doc. 16918/10. 
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the USA: see note 65  below. See also Commission Communication on the global approach to transfers of 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data to third countries, COM (2010) 492. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 24 of 30 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
So, what does the experience of the SWIFT agreement tell us about ‘internal security with a 
global perspective’, as the Commission put it in its November 2010 Action Plan?  
 
1. The law enforcement utility of personal data held by SWIFT, an international commercial 
enterprise, brought it into contact with competing and potentially conflicting regulatory and 
security regimes. The problem was exacerbated for both US and EU law enforcement 
authorities by its decision to move its European data out of the US jurisdiction. For the EU, an 
internal data protection issue became an international security issue, requiring not only 
regulatory cooperation but ultimately an international agreement. Its external competence 
flows from this necessity: thus the intra-EU police cooperation foreseen in the Treaty is 
extended to third countries, such as the USA. 
 
2. The EU is very keen to demonstrate that it is an effective actor in counter-terrorism, and an 
equal partner to the US. Here, it had serious difficulty over its ability to deliver what the 
Council and Commission had promised to the US – an agreement putting SWIFT transfers on 
a solid legal foundation. The irony is this: it is often claimed that the EU would be a more 
effective international actor if it were more supranational, more like a federal state, and less 
inter-governmental. Here, however, it was the increased powers of the European Parliament – 
that is, an increased level of supranationality – in the JHA field and in the procedure for 
concluding international agreements that caused the problems. By comparison, an agreement 
concluded under the former third pillar would not have posed these problems for the Council, 
which could have approved it under former Articles 24 and 38 TEU. 
 
The history of the agreements on passenger name records with the USA and Australia is also 
illustrative of this point. The PNR agreement with the USA was originally concluded in 2004 
under Community powers; the European Parliament bringing an action challenging the 
legality of the concluding decision, the Court held that Community powers could not be used 
to conclude an agreement the primary purpose of which was public security, combating 
terrorism and organised crime.62 The Union then negotiated a new agreement with the USA 
which was signed in 2007 by the Council on the basis of third pillar powers, Articles 24 and 38 
TEU.63  An agreement with Australia was signed in 200864
                                            
62  Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04  European Parliament v Council  [2006] ECR I-4721.  See further V 
Mitsilegas, ‘The European Union and the Globalisation of Criminal Law', (2009-2010) vol.12 Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies, p.337 at 374-379. 
 and both agreements have been 
63 Council Decision 2007/551/CFSP/JHA of 23 July 2007 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an 
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provisionally applied since their signature (it will be recalled that provisional application was 
also foreseen for the first SWIFT agreement). In May 2010 the European Parliament decided 
to defer its consent to the conclusion of these PNR agreements with the USA and Australia 
and in December 2010 the Council agreed a negotiating mandate for new PNR agreements – 
which like the SWIFT agreement will require the Parliament’s consent for their conclusion. 65
 
  
3. The SWIFT story thus demonstrates the substantial shift brought about by the Treaty of 
Lisbon in the balance of power as regards international treaty-making by the EU. Wherever 
internal acts are to be adopted by the ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ (formerly known as co-
decision), the Parliament must give its consent. This applies not only to agreements involving 
police cooperation and public security, as here, but also trade agreements. If the Parliament 
must give its consent to the final text, it will in practice need to be involved by the 
Commission and the Council at earlier stages, even though Article 218 TFEU does not give 
the Parliament a formal role in the adoption of the negotiating mandate or the negotiation 
itself. As Monar points out, although this may result in an increased democratic legitimacy, 
the European Parliament is not subject to the same parliamentary-majority-based disciplines 
as national Parliaments and the EU’s executive cannot take its support for granted.66
 
  
Nor is the SWIFT agreement an isolated case. The Parliament’s involvement in the PNR 
agreements has already been noted. In addition, the European Parliament has brought an 
action before the EU Court of Justice contesting the legal basis chosen by the Commission and 
Council for the revised EU Regulation on the freezing of assets  of those connected with 
terrorism.67 The Regulation is based on Article 215 TFEU, referring in its Preamble to the 
original 2002 Common Position.68
                                                                                                                                     
Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement) OJ L 204, 4.8.2007, p. 16. 
  The European Parliament is arguing that the 2009 
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64 Council Decision 2008/651/CFSP/JHA of 30 June 2008 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of an 
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on the area of freedom, security and justice and under which the ordinary legislative 
procedure is used) instead of Article 215 TFEU (which deals with restrictive measures against 
third countries, individuals and groups and under which the Parliament only has the right to 
be informed). The relationship between the two provisions is by no means clear69 
(demonstrating again the difficulty of separating internal and external security issues) but 
what is clear is the Parliament’s determination to maximise its influence over counter-
terrorism policy, both external and internal. The ‘pillar politics’ epitomised by the PNR case 
has not disappeared with the removal of the pillar structure by the Treaty of Lisbon.70
 
 
4. International counter-terrorism policy-making requires a balance between security risks 
and safeguarding against risks to human rights and misuse of personal data.  Although the EU 
has developed its own internal standards and monitoring mechanisms, including the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, the extension to third countries of these standards and 
safeguards, and the ability of individuals to enforce their rights, is not always straightforward. 
As de Hert and de Schutter point out, ‘Controlling national actors is of course much easier 
than controlling actors outside the legal regime of the Member State of the data subjects.’71 
The EU has in fact been accused of double standards from both directions: it has been accused 
of double standards in allowing data transfers to third countries, in particular the USA, 
without ensuring that its own internal standards are met;72 it has also been accused of double 
standards by US authorities who argue that the EU institutions themselves do not necessarily 
abide by the standards imposed  on US authorities.73
 
  At the heart of the problem is the 
fragmentation of the EU’s own internal regime for handling personal data in the context of 
law enforcement, and its uncertain balance between the principles of availability of data 
(making transfers possible under certain conditions and for specific purposes), and of 
adequacy of data protection. 
With respect to certain key partners, such as the USA, the EU has decided that an overall 
regulatory framework for transnational data protection is needed, and at the same time this 
must be compatible with its own internal standards. Here then it is not only a matter of 
external action being necessary to achieve internal security objectives; we can also see internal 
data protection objectives constraining and shaping that external action: as the Internal 
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Security Strategy puts it, ‘Europe must consolidate a security model, based on the principles 
and values of the Union: respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, 
democracy, dialogue, tolerance, transparency and solidarity.’74
 
 
5. The battle of assertions. There is much talk on all sides of the need to achieve an acceptable 
balance between security and law enforcement, and fundamental rights and data protection, 
between availability of data and adequacy of protection. But what is acceptable and how are 
the risks assessed? In practice there appear to be no objective criteria and so the debate 
becomes a series of assertions by different actors: the US Treasury, the EU Commission, the 
Council and Member States, the European Parliament. This is perhaps inevitable but it 
suggests that the outcome is in the end a political compromise rather than a technocratic 
solution. And the new EU Treaty architecture means that although the crafting of a 
compromise is in the hands of Commission and Council, the European Parliament will have 
the last word. It is perhaps too early to say whether, in reaction to the much-discussed process 
of securitization,75
 
  we will see a rebalancing and a re-politicization of Justice and Home 
Affairs within the EU.  
6. In the case of SWIFT – as in the earlier case of PNR – EU policy appears primarily reactive: 
to both commercial pressure and to US requirements.  There is a tendency for the EU to 
follow the US lead.76
 
 This is not the same as accepting US standards. It is unhappy sending 
bulk data to the US, but its response is to build its own version: an EU-TFTP which would 
involve EU-based authorities sifting through the bulk data, constrained by EU standards and 
controls. The Internal Security Strategy speaks of a European Security Model but it is not 
entirely clear what is specifically European about it. Should the EU be thinking of different 
and better solutions?  
The EU’s ambition is to be able to offer a Security Strategy that integrates internal security 
objectives with external instruments and policies, to use its key relationships, its 
neighbourhood policy77
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77 On the JHA and the EU’s neighbourhood policy, see T Balzacq (ed), The External Dimension of EU Justice and 
Home Affairs - Governance, Neighbours, Security, Palgrave Macmillan 2009, and S Lavenex and N Wichmann 
'The External Governance of EU Internal Security' (2009) 31 Journal of European Integration 83; on the JHA and 
EU policy towards the Western Balkans, see F Trauner, 'Deconstructing the EU's Routes of Influence in Justice 
and Home Affairs in the Western Balkans' (2009) 31 Journal of European Integration, 65. Working Paper No: 04/2011    Page 28 of 30 
also hopes to be able to integrate its fundamental values – including fundamental rights and 
the rule of law – into its policies on justice and home affairs. We have looked at only one small 
example of the difficulty in doing just that, especially when a third country’s own security 
needs and different regulatory approaches come into the picture. But even this small example 
demonstrates the impact of an important new focus of EU external policy. 
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